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The Road to Regulation: Embracing the Rise of Ridesharing in Pennsylvania 
Rob Dare 
Introduction 
 Disruptive innovation, says noted scholar and author Clayton Christensen, 
“describes a process by which a product or service takes root initially in simple 
applications at the bottom of a market and then relentlessly moves up market, 
eventually displacing established competitors.”1 The rapid advancement of 
technology, and the ease with which smartphone applications may be created, 
has led to a subcategory of disruptive innovation that some commentators call 
Big Bang Disruptors, that is, “companies that combine increasingly cheap off-the-
shelf component technologies with new business models and test them directly in 
the marketplace.”2 Once the product is launched, the losers fail quickly. However, 
                                                        
1.  Clayton Christensen, Disruptive Innovation, 
http://www.claytonchristensen.com/key-concepts/. For a more detailed 
explanation of disruptive innovation, watch Professor Christensen explain his 
landmark concept at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qDrMAzCHFUU. 
2. Paul Nunes and Larry Downes, How Innovations Become Better and 
Cheaper, FORBES.com (May 9, 2013) 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/bigbangdisruption/2013/05/09/welcome-to-the-
world-of-better-and-cheaper/print/. For further discussion on the concept of Big 
Bang Disruptors and how competitors are dealing with them, see Paul Nunes and 
Larry Downes, Big-Bang Dispution, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar. 2013, available at 
http://www.accenture.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/PDF/Accenture-Big-bang-
Disruption.pdf; see also Larry Downes, Uber’s battle in Seattle highlights the 
irony of regulation hurting the consumers it was designed to help, WASH. POST 
(Mar. 24, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/innovations/wp/2014/03/24/ubers-
battle-in-seattle-highlights-the-irony-of-regulation-hurting-the-consumers-it-




if the product succeeds, customer adoption can be nearly immediate, and “the 
winners of the model scale rapidly, as consumers use some of the same 
technologies as the innovators to socialize their preferences on a near 
instantaneous basis.”3 
Two triumphant winners of this model are Uber and Lyft, companies 
whose smartphone applications allow users and consumers to arrange for a ride 
from nearby drivers, a concept collectively termed “ridesharing.”4 Uber, a startup 
founded in 2009, was recently valued at $3.5 billion,5 and Lyft, founded in 2012, 
was valued at $700 million6 — less than two years after its inception. Ridesharing 
companies like Uber and Lyft identified what they perceived as a technologically 
ailing industry — transportation — and introduced a system that enhances 
consumer experience, particularly in urban areas, where traditional forms of 
transportation, namely taxicabs, have long-remained resistant to change or 
competition.  
While ridesharing companies have sparked consumer hope, their 
operations continue to be a source of regulatory unrest. Opponents of rideshare 
companies have said that companies like Uber and Lyft are operating outside of 
                                                        
3. Id.  
4. The development and operations of Uber, Lyft, and the concept of 
ridesharing is discussed at length, infra, footnotes 39-60 and accompanying text. 
5. Mark Milian and Ari Levy, Uber’s Google-Led Deal Said to Value 
Company at $3.5 Billion, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 23, 2013), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-23/uber-s-google-led-funding-said-
to-value-company-at-3-5-billion.html. 
6. Douglas MacMillan and Evelyn Rusli, WALL ST. J., Ride-Sharing App Lyft 





the taxicab’s government-granted system, and are stealing taxicab business. 
Rideshare supporters, on the other hand, generally claim that technological 
innovation and a customer-service based approach serve a different market, 
provide new services, and are popular with the traveling public. 
The expansion of UberX7 and Lyft to cities across the United States8 has 
forced state, city, and county governments to decide if, and how, ridesharing 
companies should be regulated. Some cities have completely banned ridesharing 
operations, while others have embraced the competition. One of the most recent 
debates commenced in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, with the arrival of Lyft at the 
city on February 7, 2014,9 and UberX a few days later.10  
Part I of this article provides a brief historical overview of the taxicab 
industry and the development of its regulation. Part II of the article traces the 
rapid rise and increasing popularity of ridesharing companies. Next, Part III 
analyzes the various legislative responses to the introduction of companies like 
UberX and Lyft. Lastly, Part IV of the article discusses Pittsburgh’s reaction to 
ridesharing, and offers the regulatory framework by which Pennsylvania would 
most benefit. 
                                                        
7. UberX is Uber’s ridesharing ystem involving drivers of personal vehicles, 
as opposed to its luxury line, Uber Black. See infra footnotes 38-44 and 
accompanying text.. 
8. As of March 10, 2014, Uber operates in 36 U.S. cities. See Uber, Cities, 
UBER BLOG, https://www.uber.com/cities. Lyft operates in 24 U.S. cities. See Lyft, 
Cities, https://www.lyft.me/cities. 
9. Justine Coyne, Ride-sharing startup Lyft launches in Pittsburgh Friday, 
PITT. BUS. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2014, 
http://www.bizjournals.com/pittsburgh/blog/techflash/2014/02/ride-sharing-
startup-lyft-launches-in.html?page=all 
10. Meagan, Pittsburgh, Your Uber Is Arriving Now, UBER.COM (February 11, 
2014), http://blog.uber.com/pituberX. 
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I. A Brief History of Taxicab Regulation 
 Hackneys, or horse-drawn carriages for hire, entered the markets of 
London and Paris between 1600 and 1620, and were quickly regulated, requiring 
licenses to operate, so as to “restrain the multitude and promiscuous use of 
coaches.”11 In the United States, horsedrawn carriages met competition toward 
the end of the 19th century, with the introduction of automobiles, and by 1899, 
there were nearly one hundred taxicabs on New York City streets.12 By the 1920s, 
industrialists, and automobile manufacturers like Ford Motor Company and 
General Motors, realized the enormous economic potential of the taxi industry, 
and became owners of fleets that created an increasingly sizeable, and flourishing 
market.13 However, in the 1930s, on the heels of the Great Depression, the growth 
in unemployment, combined with unsold automobiles, resulted in a sharp and 
drastic increase in the number of taxis.14 With taxi rides still considered a luxury 
at that time, even fewer people could afford a ride; meanwhile, the number of 
taxis rose and occupancy rates and revenue per taxi declined.15 A chaotic state of 
the industry ensued, which The Washington Post aptly described in a 1933 
editorial: 
Cut-throat competition in a business of this kind always produces 
chaos. Drivers are working as long as sixteen hours per day, in their 
                                                        
11. Paul Stephen Dempsey, Taxi Industry Regulation, Deregulation & 
Regulation: the Paradox of Market Failure, 24 TRANSP. L.J. 73, 76 (Summer 
1996) (quoting David Williams, Information and Price Determination in Taxi 
Markets, 20 Q. REV. OF ECON. & BUS. 36 (1981).  Interestingly, Dempsey notes that 
common carrier liability traces its origins to Roman Law, beginning about the 
year 200 B.C.  
12. PBS, Taxi History, http://www.pbs.org/wnet/taxidreams/history/. 
13. Id. 
14. Dempsey, supra note 11, at 77. 
15. Id. 
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desperate efforts to eke out a living. Cabs are allowed to go 
unrepaired. . . . 
 
Together with the rise in the accident rate there has been a sharp 
decline in the financial responsibility of taxicab operators. Too 
frequently the victims of taxicab accidents bear the loss because the 
operator has no resources of his own and no liability insurance. 
There is no excuse for a city exposing its people to such dangers.16 
The response to this unruly and unsafe period “was municipal control over fares, 
licenses, insurance and other aspects of taxi service.”17 Thus, “governmental 
regulation of private firms, rather than public ownership . . . [was] deemed the 
appropriate means of protecting the public interest in economically viable modes 
of transportation.”18 
Nearly all municipalities derive the power to regulate the taxi industry 
from state legislation that either requires or permits such regulation.19 These 
statutes and municipal ordinances have been challenged as unconstitutional on a 
number of grounds, or even preempted by federal law, however, they are 
consistently upheld.20 Taxi regulation generally takes place at the local level, 
where city or county boards determine the number of taxi companies that may 
operate, as well as the total number of taxis that may provide services within the 
                                                        
16. Dempsey, supra note 11, at 77 (citing Taxicab Chaos, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 
1933, editorial page). 
17. Id. 
18.  Id. at 76. 
19. Id. at 77. 
20. Id. at 78. Citing Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 726 
F.2d (D.C. Cir. 1983) cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 1865 (1983), Dempsey explains the 
case in which “a municipality’s taxicab regulation survived scrutiny under the 
Sherman Act, as it fell under the ‘state action’ exemption to that legislation.” Id. 
at n.15. Dempsey also points out that “[a]lthough Title VI of the Federal Aviation 
Act of 1994 preempted intrastate regulation of motor carriers of property, it did 
not preempt intrastate regulation of the transportation of passengers.” Id. 
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city.21 The city or county boards also generally hold the power to set prices, 
(usually measured by mileage), and provide safety, insurance, and service 
standards. 22 Thus, regulation may be subdivided into two categories: economic 
regulation (primarily price and market entry controls) and non-economic 
regulation (primarily safety and quality standards).23 However, the taxi 
regulatory schemes vary from city to city and state to state, thus it is difficult to 
analyze the system as a whole, but, later in the article, the specific models of 
California and Colorado will be examined in order to assess how Pennsylvania 
may regulate ridesharing company operations. 
II. The Rise of Ridesharing 
 To most of us, ridesharing is a relatively recent concept, seemingly hatched 
by Silicon Valley startups. Although companies like Uber and Lyft have recently 
harnessed the technology and model for operation, the concept itself – using 
innovative technology to match drivers and riders in real-time – is something the 
Federal Transit Authority (“FTA”) has been working on since 1992.24 The FTA’s 
goal in creating a systematic network of vehicles and passengers was primarily to 
simultaneously reduce city congestion and the adverse environmental and health 
effects caused by automobile travel. Similarly identifying the advantages of a 
                                                        
21. Id. 
22.  Id. 
23.  Lee Harris, Taxicab Economics: The Freedom to Contract for a Ride, 1 
GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 195, 197 (2002). 
24. Amber Levofsky and Allen Greenberg, Organized Dynamic Ride Sharing: 
The Potential Environmental Benefits and the Opportunity for Advancing the 




dynamic ridesharing system, several cities instituted pilot ridesharing 
programs.25 Between 1993 and 1996, five notable projects were undertaken to 
implement a system by which technology would enable a “matching” system 
where drivers and riders could identify each other, and coordinate a ride.26 Each 
system operated differently, with some using toll-free numbers and pagers to 
communicate,27 others utilizing commuter information kiosks at transportation 
centers,28 and another used the internet and email to arrange rides.29 Most of the 
programs were abandoned for low usage.30 In each instance, there was a small 
number of requests for rides and even smaller number of matches made between 
riders and drivers.31  
Analyzing the projects, Amber Levofsky and Allen Greenberg attributed 
their failures to a number of factors. First, “commuters need to be aware of a new 
service, but the abandoned services were not aggressively advertised. They were 
short lived, allowing insufficient time for effective marketing and commuter 
experimentation.”32 In addition, “people have a natural distrust of strangers, and 
are hesitant to ride in a car with one. The projects verified that without enhanced 
security measures, this is a clear deterrent to participating in a dynamic 
                                                        
25.  Levofsky and Greenberg, supra note 24, at 4. The cities that developed 
programs were Bellevue, Washington; Los Angeles, California; Sacramento, 
California; Riverside, California; and Seattle, Washington. 
26.  Id. at 5-8. 
27. Id. at 5. 
28. Id. at 6. 
29. Id. at 7. 




ridesharing program.”33 The only moderately successful program was conducted 
in Seattle, which Levofsky and Greenberg attributed to its “high computer and 
internet accessibility,” making commuters more willing and able to use the 
system.34 Levofsky and Greenberg predicted that wireless communications and 
Global Positioning System (“GPS”) technology would be the foundation of a 
successful rideshare system because such technology “can monitor the origins 
and destinations of people seeking rides and locations of all participating vehicles 
with room for passengers.”35 Further, they noted that “the availability of [a] 
hand-held phone . . . should help facilitate this flexibility.36 
Fast-forward to 2012, when, as predicted, rapid technological 
advancement of wireless communications, GPS, and cellular phones sparked the 
development of reliable ridesharing operations. Still, “convincing people to give 
up a car and share a ride with a stranger? With the number of ride-sharing apps 
popping up recently, it could just be that the time is right,” wrote The 
Washington Post.37 Although each company operates differently, to some extent, 
the basic principle is the same: 
[p]assengers looking for a ride use the app to post their request and 
the app searches for drivers in the vicinity willing to provide rides. 
Security concerns about riding with a stranger are handled by 
thorough prescreening. Cost of the ride varies, with some fares a 
voluntary donation at a recommended amount. User ratings help 
                                                        
33. Id.  
34. Id.  
35 . Levofksy and Greenberg, supra note 24, at 11. 
36.  Id. 




keep things on an even keel. A low rating of a passenger may mean 
drivers will refuse that person’s ride request in the future.38 
 
The main players in today’s ridesharing industry are Uber, Lyft, and 
Sidecar.39 Uber was founded in 2009, and the company launched its first 
operation in San Francisco, California, in 2010 to improve upon what the 
founders perceived as a failing transportation system.40 Uber’s initial 
service was limited to what it called “Uber Black” – essentially a limousine 
service with a fleet of luxury sedans that operated on Uber’s app 
platform.41 After experiencing near-immediate success, and realizing that 
the taxi industry and its outdated business model were failing consumers 
throughout the country, Uber launched UberX.42 UberX differs from Uber 
Black in two important respects: vehicle and price.  Vehicles are not 
limited to luxury sedans, and because they are the personal vehicles of the 
drivers, they could range from a Chrysler 300 to a Toyota Prius. And, 
because it is not a luxury service, UberX fares are 35% less expensive than 
                                                        
38.  Id. 
39. For the purposes of this article – introducing legislation in Pennsylvania – 
I will focus on Uber and Lyft, because they are the only currently active 
companies in the state. Sidecar debuted in Philadelphia but has since been shut 
down. See Victor Fiorillo, PPA Sting Operation Shuts Down New Google-Backed 
“Ride Share” Service Sidecar, PHILA. MAG. (Feb. 25, 2013), 
http://www.phillymag.com/news/2013/02/25/review-google-philadelphia-ride-
share-service-sidecar-shut-down-by-city-ppa/. 
40. Travis Kalanick, Uber’s Founding, UBER BLOG (Dec. 22, 2010), 
http://blog.uber.com/2010/12/22/ubers-founding/. 
41. Leena Rao, Uber Brings its Disruptive Car Service to Chicago, TECH 
CRUNCH (Sept. 22, 2011), http://techcrunch.com/2011/09/22/uber-brings-its-
disruptive-car-service-to-chicago/. 
42. Alexia Tsotsis, Uber Opens Up Platform to Non-Limo Vehicles With 




Uber Black, and are also generally less expensive than a taxicab fare.43 
However, it should be noted that UberX uses “surge pricing,” meaning that 
fares may double or triple at times when rides are at their highest demand 
(i.e., Friday and Saturday nights, Halloween, and New Year’s Eve). Some 
have labeled this practice as price gouging,44 but Uber explains that when 
supply (the number of vehicles available to pick up riders) is tight, raising 
the price allows the company to entice more drivers onto the system, and 
as the supply increases, the price goes down.45 Nevertheless, the demand 
for improved livery service has become clear, and as result, UberX has 
become incredibly successful, now operating in over thirty-five American 
cities.46 
 Lyft began its rise to success more recently. Launched in 2012, Lyft now 
offers its services in over thirty cities nationwide.47 Unlike Uber, Lyft’s total 
operations are limited to the personal vehicle of the driver, and it does not 
maintain a separate fleet of luxury sedans or SUVs. Lyft operates much the same 
                                                        
43 . Id. Importantly, in cities and states where UberX is not regulated as a taxi, 
they are free to adjust their rates at anytime, where as taxis must adhere to rates 
set by the regulatory agency that controls them. See, e.g., Ryan Lawler, Uber 
Slashes UberX Fares in 16 Markets to Make it the Cheapest Car Service 
Available Anywhere, TECH CRUNCH (Jan. 9, 2014) 
http://techcrunch.com/2014/01/09/big-uberx-price-cuts/(noting Uber’s 
commitment to slashing fares by over 20% in most cities in which it operates),  
44.  Annie Lowery, Is Uber’s Surge Pricing an Example of High-Tech 
Gouging?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 10, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/12/magazine/is-ubers-surge-pricing-an-
example-of-high-tech-gouging.html?_r=0. 
45. Travis Kalanick, NYE Surge Price Explained, UBER BLOG (Dec. 31, 2011), 
http://blog.uber.com/2011/12/31/nye-surge-pricing-explained/. 
46  Uber, Cities, UBER BLOG, https://www.uber.com/cities. 
47. Lyft, Cities, LYFT,  http://www.lyft.com/cities. 
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that UberX does, in which a potential rider may download the application to his 
or her smartphone, complete a personal profile with credit card information, and 
then request a ride from a nearby Lyft driver whose location is identified via GPS 
on the app’s map. In some cities, the fare amount may be referred to as a 
“requested donation,” which allows a rider to increase or decrease the amount 
paid through the app.48 In other cities, Lyft charges a set amount for rides based 
on mileage, like UberX or a taxi.49 Lyft’s approach to increased rider demand is 
“Prime Time,” a system whereby driver tips are automatically applied to each 
ride, rather than as an option.50 The idea is that such a system creates a greater 
incentive for drivers to increase the supply to match the demand of the number of 
potential riders.51 Like UberX’s surge pricing, Prime Time is dynamic, and is 
switched on and off as the demand for rides rises and falls.52 
                                                        
48.  Lyft, How do I pay for a Lyft ride? LYFT.COM, 
https://www.lyft.me/help?article=1003538#How do I pay for Lyft rides? The 
donation system was created generally to avoid regulatory fines where 
ridesharing for pay was or is illegal. The cities on a donation system are: 
Baltimore, MD; Charlotte, NC; Cincinnati; OH, Columbus, OH; Dallas, TX; 
Detroit, MI; Houston, TX; Indianapolis, IN; Madison, WI; Minneapolis-St. Paul, 
MN; Phoenix, AZ; Pittsburgh, PA; Providence, RI; San Antonio, TX. See Lyft, 
Donations vs. Charges, LYFT.COM, https://www.lyft.me/help?article=1415358.  
49. Lyft, Donations vs. Charges, LYFT.COM, 
https://www.lyft.me/help?article=1415358. The following cities charge a set 
amount: Atlanta, GA; Boston, MA; Chicago, IL; Denver, CO; Los Angeles, CA; 
Nashville, TN; Orange County, CA; Sacramento, CA; San Diego, CA; San 
Francisco, CA; Santa Barbara, CA; Silicon Valley, CA; Seattle, WA; Washington, 
D.C. 
50.  Lyft, What is Prime Time? LYFT.COM, 
http://www.lyft.com/help?article=1353884 
51.  Id. 
52.  Id. 
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 Sensing the societal concern with rider safety, Lyft actively advertises its 
driver background checks, driving record checks, insurance protection,53 required 
vehicle inspections,54 and zero tolerance policy with respect to drugs and 
alcohol.55 According to Lyft, “every driver who applies to become a part of the 
community is screened for criminal offenses and driving incidents. The criminal 
background check includes national, county level and national sex offender 
databases.”56 Drivers must be age twenty-three or older, have a driver’s license 
for more than one year, maintain valid personal auto insurance that meets or 
exceeds state requirements, have no more than two moving violations in the 
previous three years, have no DUI or drug-related infractions in the last seven 
years, and no extreme infractions (e.g., hit and run, or felonies involving a 
vehicle) in his or her lifetime driving history.57 To be eligible to drive, an 
individual’s background check must not contain any of the following: sexual 
offenses, theft offenses, property damage, and other violent crimes.58 Though it 
has only officially operated for approximately eighteen months, Lyft is now “one 
                                                        
53.  According to Lyft, their coverage includes the following: Excess Liability: 
$1,000,000 limit covering passengers and/or third parties; Contingent Collision: 
$2,500 deductible and $50,000 maximum applicable to drivers who have 
purchased collision coverage on their personal policy; Excess 
Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist (UM/UIM): $1,000,000 limit covering 
drivers if they are hit by an uninsured or underinsured motorist who's at fault. 
See Lyft, We Go the Extra Mile for Safety, LYFT.COM, http://www.lyft.com/safety. 
54.  Vehicles must be model year 2000 or newer and each must pass [Lyft’s] 
vehicle safety inspection. See Lyft, supra note 53. 
55.  Id. 
56.  Id. 
57.  Id. 
58.  Id. 
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of the most compelling players in the ride-sharing space,”59 and having recently 
completed a new round of $250 million in financing that will enable the company 
to enter international markets, Lyft is clearly Uber’s top competition.60 
 
 
An Ailing Industry 
 While the introduction of ridesharing companies and apps has enhanced 
the consumer transportation experience, it has brought fear and frustration to 
the taxi industry, and to a lesser extent, existing public transportation systems. 
Brad Newsham, a former San Francisco cab driver for twenty-eight years, and 
former chair of the United Taxicab Workers, concluded that “[t]he cab industry 
here shot itself in the foot. . . . It has refused to deploy dispatching innovations. It 
has refused to keep up with the times and the times have moved right past 
them.”61  
Historically, taxi companies have been especially slow to adopt two simple 
technological improvements that consumers and hospitality operators have long-
called for: onboard credit card readers and GPS tracking systems.62 Though some 
                                                        
59.  Austin Carr, Lyft Raises $250 Million for Aggressive Expansion in Race 
Against Uber, FAST COMPANY (Apr. 2, 2014), 
http://www.fastcompany.com/3028564/most-innovative-companies/lyft-raises-
250m-for-aggressive-expansion-in-race-against-uber. 
60.  Id. 
61. Jon Brooks, Will ‘Ride Sharing’ Kill San Francisco’s Taxi Industry? 
KQED.COM (Nov. 7, 2013), http://blogs.kqed.org/newsfix/2013/11/07/taxis-lyft-
ride-service-war-on-streets-of-san-francisco. 
62. See Naomi R. Kooker, HUB Taxis Slow to Adopt New Technologies, 
BOSTON BUS. J. (Sept. 24, 2007), 
http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/stories/2007/09/24/story3.html (Noting, 
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cities, like New York City and Washington, D.C., mandate the use of such 
technology, they comprise the minority.63 The reason most cited for declining 
adoption of new technology is simple: cost.64 But the regulatory scheme in which 
most taxicabs operate makes adoption a more complex decision than it may 
appear. TaxiPass, a company that partners with taxicab companies to develop 
and implement secure cashless payment systems, aptly explains specific causes of 
the industry’s failure to adopt new technology: 
High Investment Cost 
Traditional providers sell or lease expensive solutions that come 
with significant ongoing wireless fees, costly purchase/lease prices, 
and complex merchant accounts that must be closely managed and 
heavily managed. 
 
Capped Pricing doesn’t cover increased costs 
Since taxi fares have capped price rates like other utilities, taxi 
drivers/fleets cannot raise their rates when their cost of business 
goes up, as it does when passengers increasingly utilize more costly 
forms of payment like cards. 
 
Fragmented and independent industry doesn’t have scale and 
consolidation to properly manage 
Since most drivers are unable to implement secure, complex credit 
and debit card banking systems, they resort to the selling of manual 
imprints of passenger credit cards to the gray market. This illegal 
practice is risky for both passenger and driver, yet has become the 
standard for credit card processing in taxis. 
 
High Variable Cost 
Even without the expenses associated with maintaining secure 
cashless payment systems, cabbies routinely pay up to 10% to 
                                                        
in 2007, Boston cab companies’ failure to adopt technology that riders said would 
improve cab experiences). 
63. New York Taxi and Limousine Commission, Taxicab Passenger 
Enhancements Project, NYC.GOV, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/html/passenger/taxicab_serv_enh.shtml; 
Mike Debonis, Credit Cards in D.C. Taxicabs by March 30, WASH. POST (Jan. 18, 
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/mike-
debonis/wp/2013/01/18/credit-cards-in-d-c-taxicabs-by-march-31/. 
64. Kooker, supra note 62. 
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process credit card fares, making them a highly unattractive and 
cumbersome form of payment to accept for a driver on a ‘rate-
regulated’ income. 
 
By simply forcing cabbies to adopt technology without addressing 
the above issues, creates a ‘race to the bottom’ of the lowest cost 
tech solution to meet the regulated requirements and even then 
drivers will fight consumer usage given the high variable cost. 
Unless a regulator has 300 staff members like they do in New York, 
implementing 1000′s of mystery shopper rides to enforce 
regulations is not a possibility.65 
 
What TaxiPass fails to mention, however, is that in many cities, taxicab 
companies have little incentive to upgrade technology and its associated costs 
because, due to the heavily restricted number of operators and cabs, they are not 
at risk of losing the market share. That was, until the introduction of competition 
from the likes of Uber and Lyft, who have caused taxi companies to re-evaluate 
their policies after, in some instances, losing 25-30% of their business.66 
 Another sector fearful of the impact of ridesharing companies is public 
transportation.67 It is argued that the creation and rise of private transportation 
companies “create[s] a two-tier transportation caste system, where the private 
sector solutions flourish, often at the expense of the public infrastructure that a 
large part of the population still depends on to get to work and go about their 
lives.”68 Further, critics predict, “when policy-makers begin to see [private 
                                                        
65. TaxiPass, Regulators, TAXIPASS.COM, http://taxipass.com/regulators/. 
66.  Brooks, supra note 79 (stating that “Hansu Kim, owner of San Francisco’s 
DeSoto Cab, puts the drop in all taxi business citywide . . . anywhere from 25 to 
33 percent in the past year.”). 
67.  Though it should be noted that commentators have been the voice of 
opposition, not the public transit authorities themselves. 
68. Kevin Roose, Transit Strike Shows the Dark Side of Silicon Valley’s 




transportation companies] as legitimate replacements for public infrastructure, 
their incentives to make public services better will disappear.”69  
Supporters of ridesharing companies dispel the notion that they undercut 
public transit by, first, pointing out that “[t]he private transportation technology 
that undermined public transportation was invented in the 1920s and it’s called 
the ‘automobile’ and it’s the dominant transportation mode share in every non-
New York metro area and has been for a long time.”70 Second, ride sharing apps 
serve to complement public transit, not replace it. “Most people use ride sharing  
. . . as part of a range of options that tend to decrease car ownership, not 
necessarily public transit.”71 In a San Francisco survey, riders were asked what 
transportation they use aside from ride sharing apps and 53% said public 
transportation, followed by 28% who drive.72 Further, companies like UberX and 
Lyft are providing a cheaper alternative for people who otherwise would not take 
taxis, either because they cannot afford it, or because they are unhappy with taxi 
service and reliability of drivers.73 
III. The Regulatory Battle 
                                                        
69.  Id. 
70.  Matthew Yglesias, Uber and Lyft Aren’t Killing Public Transportation, 
SLATE (July 3, 2013), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2013/07/03/uber_and_lyft_aren_t_kil
ling_public_transportation.html. 
71.  Tomio Geron, While BART Strikes Continues, Do Ride-Sharing Apps 
Complement or Undercut Public Transit?, FORBES (July 3, 2013), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2013/07/03/while-bart-strikes-
continues-do-ride-sharing-apps-complement-or-undercut-public-transit/ 
(paraphrasing observations of Susan Shaheen, Co-Director, UC Berkeley 
Transportation Sustainability Research Center). 
72. Id.   
73.  Id. 
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 The introduction of rideshare companies like UberX and Lyft to cities 
throughout the U.S. has caused each city and state to confront and evaluate the 
regulatory grey area in which the companies operate. Are they taxis? Should they 
be regulated like taxis? Do they fit into existing statutory schemes? These are the 
types of questions that cities and states had to answer, and continue to do so, and 
because each city and state has a unique regulatory framework and political 
environment, each has generally addressed the issue differently. 
 In Chicago, Illinois, in support of the arrival of rideshare companies, but 
sensitive to public safety concerns, Mayor Rahm Emanuel proposed a new 
ordinance aimed to create new regulations for these companies, requiring, among 
other things, driver training, background checks, vehicle inspections, and 
insurance provisions.74 The taxi industry complained that the rules would not go 
far enough, and that it makes no sense to create separate rules for companies that 
use apps, when many taxi drivers use them, too.75 Thus, taxi drivers responded to 
the mayor’s proposal by suing the City of Chicago, claiming the city is violating 
the drivers’ rights by allowing UberX and Lyft to operate unregulated.76 
Rideshare drivers recently filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit,77 and the 
                                                        
74.  See Jon Hilkevitch, Chicago Looking to Regulate Ride-Sharing Services, 
CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 3, 2014), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-02-
03/news/ct-getting-around-met-0203-20140203_1_ride-sharing-lyft-ride-
share-companies. Mayor Emanuel’s proposal would create a new category of 
“transportation network companies” much like California did, which is discussed 
infra. 
75. Id. 
76.  See Andrew Harris, Chicago Cabbies Sue Over Unregulated Uber, Lyft, 
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-
06/chicago-cabbies-sue-over-unregulated-uber-lyft-services.html. 
77.  See Michelle Manchir, Rideshare Drivers Seek Dismissal of Cab 
Companies’ Lawsuit, CHI. TRIB (Mar. 25, 2014), 
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regulatory discussion continues among the cab companies, rideshare companies, 
the city, and the state legislature.78  
Shortly after UberX and Lyft launched in Washington, D.C., the D.C. 
Taxicab Commission passed emergency measures that allowed the companies to 
operate, but required them to perform background checks on drivers, obtain 
commercial liability insurance for drivers, and to adhere to a zero-tolerance 
policy with respect to drugs and alcohol.79 Then, in January 2014, the Taxicab 
Commission charged a panel with researching and investigating ridesharing 
operations, and to submit a report of “findings and recommendations” that may 
be used to develop effective rulemaking.80 First, the report found that the 
Commission undoubtedly maintained the ability to regulate ridesharing 
activities.81 The report pointed out that “[i]n most respects, the business model 
for “ridesharing” vehicles fits the existing regulations for black cars (“sedans”) in 
Title 31, Chapter 14 of the D.C. Municipal Regulations” and the panel 




78.  See Michelle Manchir, Rideshare Regulations Advanced by House 
Committee, CHI. TRIB (Mar. 26, 2014), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-
03-26/news/chi-uber-lyft-rideshare-regulations-20140326_1_illinois-house-
house-committee-ride-share-companies. 
79.  See Lori Aratani, Proposal would allow D.C. Cabs to Embrace ‘Price 




80. GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA TAXICAB COMMISSION, REPORT 
OF THE PANEL ON INDUSTRY, Findings and Recommendations on “Ridesharing, 
TAXI-LIBRARY.ORG, 2 (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.taxi-library.org/dc-
recommendations-on-ridesharing_2014-01-24.pdf. 
81.  Id. 
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“recommend[ed] these rules be redrafted to fit both classes of service.”82 As for 
any proposed regulations, the report recommended, among other things, that 
rules: (1) should require companies to purchase adequate liability insurance to 
“cover claims by passengers and members of the public injured when 
“ridesharing” vehicles are involved in accidents”; (2) should require that “drivers 
[] be properly screened and their vehicles inspected for safety according to 
standards set by the Commission”; (3) should require drivers to receive basic 
training from the “ridesharing” service; and (4) should require each ridesharing 
service to maintain a zero tolerance policy for drugs and alcohol, including at the 
time of application.83 Finally, the panel explained the future challenges of the taxi 
industry, concluding that: 
“Ridesharing” will pose challenges for preserving fair 
competition in the public vehicle for hire industry. Some taxicabs 
will find it difficult to fairly compete, which threatens the viability 
of the taxicab industry, the only legal source of street hail service. 
This is contrary to the interests of the District of Columbia. The 
Commission should consider lawful, non-protectionist means of 
leveling the competitive playing field. Proposed regulations should 
allow a digital dispatch service to set the entire fare when it books a 
trip for a taxicab, thereby allowing taxicab fares to fluctuate up and 
down in response to market demand, in the same way they now do 
for black cars and would for “ridesharing” vehicles. The challenges 
to the taxicab industry may also have the effect of reducing the 
number of wheelchair-accessible vehicles. The Commission should 
consider measures to continue increasing the availability of 
accessible vehicles if “ridesharing” becomes an approved service.84 
Though rideshare operations have yet to be officially approved in 
Washington, D.C., D.C. Council members heeded the advice of the panel and 
                                                        
82.  Id. at 3. 
83.  Id. 
84.  Id. 
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recently proposed legislation that would allow the city’s taxi drivers to embrace 
what UberX deemed “surge pricing,” in which prices are adjusted in real-time 
according to demand.85 Under the proposal, “passengers who book via a mobile 
app would be told ahead of time what they can expect to pay for their taxi ride . . . 
[and] [t]he price would not be set by individual cabdrivers but by the D.C. 
Taxicab Commission or the mobile dispatch service. Individuals who hail a taxi 
on the street would still pay metered rates.86 Council members say the legislation 
“will allow traditional cabs to better compete with new app-based ride services” 
and that it “strikes a balance between allowing new ride services — in which 
individuals transport passengers using their own cars — to grow while evening 
the playing field for D.C. cabdrivers.”87 To date, the proposal has not been voted 
on, and D.C. cab drivers, who are required to spend hundreds or thousands or 
dollars to comply with regulations, continue to maintain that rideshare 
companies have caused “irreparable harm” to cabbies, and should be forced to 
play by the same rules.88 
 Surprisingly, in Seattle, a city with a rich history of cultivating and 
embracing innovative technology, the taxi industry scored a major victory 
recently when the City Council voted to place a cap on the number of vehicles 
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each rideshare company may have on the road.89 The measure limits UberX, Lyft, 
and Sidecar (the companies currently operating in Seattle) to 150 drivers on the 
road at any given time, for a collective total of 450, a significant decrease from 
the estimated 2,000 vehicles that were on the road before the vote.90 The bill, 
which the Council started working on in March 2013,91 also created regulations 
that require safety inspections of vehicles, require drivers to obtain personal auto 
insurance that meets state requirements, and require rideshare companies to 
carry commercial liability insurance.92 Though he vowed to sign the legislation, 
Seattle Mayor Ed Murray expressed skepticism with respect to the solution to the 
city’s transportation issues, stating that  
[h]ad I been in office earlier than January, I would have sent my 
own recommendations to Council for integrating rideshare 
companies into our existing regulatory framework while also 
reforming that framework to ease undue burdens on taxis. . . . I do 
not believe it is either a complete solution or a long-term solution. 
 
. . . .  
 
I remain concerned about the issue of insurance, which I believe is 
already too burdensome for taxis. I remain concerned about the 
need to level the regulatory playing field for taxis generally, which 
includes issues of training, fees, rates, use of technology and 
latitude for innovation. And I remain concerned about the issue of 
                                                        
89. Reid Wilson, Seattle Becomes First City to Cap Uber, Lyft Vehicles, WASH. 
POST (Mar. 18, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/03/18/seattle-
becomes-first-city-to-cap-uber-lyft-vehicles/. 
90.  Id. 
91.  Joel Connelly, Council Votes to Limit, Regulate Ride Share Firms, 
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER (Mar. 17, 2014), 
http://blog.seattlepi.com/seattlepolitics/2014/03/17/council-votes-to-limit-
regulate-ride-share-firms/#20586101=0. 
92.  Id.; Wilson, supra note 89. 
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caps on rideshare vehicles, which I believe is unreasonably 
restrictive and unworkable in practice.93 
Though the cap will be in place for the next year,94 it is expected that 
conversations will continue among the City Council, Mayor Murray (who 
is notably the former Chair of the House Transportation Committee),95 
and the ridesharing companies. 
Chicago, Washington, D.C., and Seattle, are just a few examples of city and 
state governments’ clash with rideshare companies. And, while those cities have 
allowed operations to continue on varying levels, on the other hand, Miami, Fl., 
Houston, Tex., Portland, Ore., Austin, Tex., and New Orleans, La. have all refused 
to allow companies like Uber and Lyft to operate. 96 The cities of Minneapolis, 
Minn., St. Paul, Minn., Milwaukee, Wisc., and Detroit, Mich., have allowed the 
companies to operate, but have strictly held them to the standards and 
requirements of taxicabs under local or state law.97 
Currently, California is the only state that has formally regulated 
ridesharing companies. Another, Colorado, having passed legislation through the 
state House that would regulate ridesharing, is close. Thus, the statutory 
schemes, the regulatory battles, and legislative responses in those states warrant 
a closer look. 
                                                        
93.  Office of the Mayor, Mayor Murray Responds to Ride Share Legislation 
Approved by City Council, SEATTLE.GOV (Mar. 17, 2014), 
http://murray.seattle.gov/mayor-murray-responds-to-rideshare-legislation-
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94. Connelly, supra note 91. 
95.  Office of the Mayor, About Ed, SEATTLE.GOV, 
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In California, like many other states, a state statute requires municipalities 
to regulate the local taxi industry.98 The city of Los Angeles, for example, requires 
an applicant to prove “pubic convenience and necessity” to gain entry to the taxi 
market, and entry, rates, and business practices are governed by a single 
municipal body, the Los Angeles Board of Transportation Commissioners.99 The 
Los Angeles ordinance contains requirements of insurance,100 an identification 
system of color and signage,101 and rate regulations,102 and outlines the scenario 
in which the Commissioners may suspend or revoke a driver or vehicle permit.103 
 However, California law distinguishes between taxi services, regulated by 
cities and counties, and “charter party carrier” services,104 which are subject to 
                                                        
98.  CAL. GOV’T CODE § 53075.5 (West 2011) (stating that “every city or county 
shall protect the public health, safety, and welfare by adopting an ordinance or 
resolution in regard to taxicab transportation service rendered in vehicles for 
carrying not more than eight persons, excluding the driver, which is operating 
within the jurisdiction of the city or county . . .”) 
99.  LOS ANGELES MUN. CODE, ch VII, art 1., §§ 71.00, 71.12. The governing body 
for San Francisco, another California transportation hub, is the San Francisco 
Municipal Transportation Agency (SFMTA). See San Francisco Municipal 
Transportation Agency, Taxi Industry, http://www.sfmta.com/services/taxi-
industry. 
100.  LOS ANGELES MUN. CODE, ch VII, art 1., § 71.14 
101.  Id. at §§ 71.16, 71.19, 71.20, 71.21. 
102.  Id. at § 71.25. 
103.  Id. at §§ 71.08. 
104.  See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 5353 (g) (West 2007) (listing the 
exclusions to the classification of Charter Party Carrier of Passengers, and stating 
one as  “taxicab transportation service licensed and regulated by a city or county, 
by ordinance or resolution, rendered in vehicles designed for carrying not more 
than eight persons excluding the driver”). 
 24 
regulation by the California Public Utilities Commission.105 Charter party carriers 
are defined as: 
every person engaged in the transportation of persons by motor 
vehicle for compensation, whether in common or contract carriage, 
over any public highway in this state. “Charter-party carrier of 
passengers” includes any person, corporation, or other entity 
engaged in the provision of a hired driver service when a rented 
motor vehicle is being operated by a hired driver.106 
Charter party carriers of passengers must obtain from the Commission a 
certificate of public convenience,107 maintain trip reports that detail the ride’s 
point of origin and destination,108 carry liability insurance,109 and cannot 
advertise their services as taxi operations.110 This distinction between taxis and 
charter party carriers of passengers was critical to the state’s approach to the 
regulation of ridesharing companies. 
 When UberX and Lyft launched in California in 2012, the California Public 
Utilities Commission issued a cease and desist letter to the companies arguing 
that they needed to be licensed.111 The letter informed the companies that they 
were subject to regulation by the CPUC as “charter-party carriers.”112 However, 
                                                        
105.  Id. at § 5381 (stating that [“t]o the extent that such is not inconsistent with 
the provisions of this chapter, the commission may supervise and regulate every 
charter-party carrier of passengers in the State and may do all things, whether 
specifically designated in this part, or in addition thereto, which are necessary 
and convenient in the exercise of such power and jurisdiction.” 
106. Id. at § 5360. 
107.  Id. at § 5371. 
108. Id. at § 5381.5. 
109. Id. at § 5391. 
110. Id. at § 5386.5. 
111. Tomio Geron, Ride-Sharing Startups Get California Cease and Desist 
Letters, FORBES (Oct. 8, 2012), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2012/10/08/ride-sharing-startups-
get-california-cease-and-desist-letters/.  
112.  Id. 
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negotiations between the parties ensued, and an interim agreement was reached, 
whereby the companies were allowed to operate while the CPUC investigated to 
determine if, and how, the companies should be regulated.113 A flyer created by 
the San Francisco Cab Drivers Association and the United Taxicab Workers of 
San Francisco described the position of the cab drivers: 
Unlicensed, uninspected, unregulated and underinsured taxis are 
being allowed to roam the streets, creating a public safety hazard, 
increased congestion, greenhouse gasses and unfair competition to 
law abiding cab drivers. Under the guise of ‘Ridesharing’ these 
rogue taxis are avoiding all regulations, inspections, fees and 
insurance requirements enforced on legal taxicabs.114 
The rideshare companies countered by arguing that they are not taxis and thus 
are not subject to regulations of taxis, and that they provide better service and 
more safety protections than traditional taxis.115 The companies urged the CPUC 
not to attempt to force fit the companies’ operations into outdated transportation 
regulations. 
 An exhaustive rulemaking process commenced on December 12, 2012, and 
during the following seven months the CPUC carefully considered comments 
from a number of interested parties, including the CEO of a cab company, the 
Greater California  Livery Association, International Association of 
Transportation Regulators, Uber Technologies, Personal Insurance Federation of 
                                                        
113.  Tomio Geron, Lyft Cleared by CPUC, Launches Ride-Sharing in Los 
Angeles, FORBES (Jan. 30, 2013), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2013/01/30/lyft-cleared-by-cpuc-
launches-ride-sharing-in-los-angeles/. 
114. Tomio Geron, California PUC Proposes Legalizing Ride-Sharing From 
Startups Lyft, Sidecar, Uber, FORBES (July 30, 2013), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2013/07/30/california-puc-proposes-
legalizing-ride-sharing-companies-lyft-sidecar-uber/. 
115.  See id. 
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California, San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency, and the United 
Taxicab Workers.116 The CPUC sought comment on “how the Commission’s 
existing jurisdiction pursuant to the California Constitution and the Public 
Utilities Code should be applied” to rideshare companies and their drivers.117 In 
addition, the Commission sought comment on “whether any existing legislation 
should be modified or if new legislation should be enacted.”118 
 At end of July, the CPUC issued its proposed ruling, and it was approved 
on September 13, 2013, making California the first state to regulate ridesharing. 
The CPUC determined that it has the jurisdiction and duty to establish 
regulations pertaining to ride sharing services pursuant to Article XII of the 
California Constitution and Section 5360 of the Public Utilities Code, which 
defines “charter party carrier of passengers.”119 The Commission noted that it 
“may supervise and regulate every charter-party carrier of passengers in the State 
and may do all things . . . necessary and convenient in the exercise of such power 
and jurisdiction.”120 The Commission exercised its jurisdiction, and its power to 
develop a new category of regulation when technology is introduced into an 
existing industry,121 creating a new category of charter-party carriers, which it 
                                                        
116. California Public Utilities Commission [hereinafter “California PUC”], 
Decision Adopting Rules and Regulations to Protect Public Safety While 
Allowing New Entrants to the Transportation Industry 5, 6, 7 (July 30, 2013), 
http://sfcda.org/CPUC/CPUCPROPSOEDrec.PDF. 
117. Id. at 8.  
118.  Id. 
119. California PUC, supra note 116, at 21-22; See § 5360, supra note 102 and 
accompanying text for the definition of “charter-party carrier.” 
120. California PUC, supra note 116, at 22 (quoting CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 
5381). 
121. Id. at 23; See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 701. 
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called Transportation Network Companies (“TNC”). TNCs were defined as “an 
organization, whether a corporation, partnership, sole proprietor, or other form, 
operating in California that provides transportation services for compensation 
using an online enable app or platform to connect passengers with drivers using 
their personal vehicles.”122 The Commission then created a list of rules and 
regulations applicable to all TNCs (including UberX and Lyft) effective 
immediately.123 Among other things, the regulations included specific insurance 
requirements,124 mandated criminal background checks of drivers,125 required 
vehicle inspections,126 and required the submission of a variety of annual reports 
aimed to identify and curb rider discrimination.127 
Colorado 
Similar to California, and unlike most states, in which city governments 
regulate the taxi companies, in Colorado, the state Public Utilities Commission 
(“PUC”) regulates the taxi industry of the state’s major cities, including Denver.128 
The PUC maintains the “authority and duty to prescribe such reasonable rules 
covering the operations of motor carriers as may be necessary” to “[e]nsure 
public safety, financial responsibility, consumer protection, service quality, and 
the provision of services to the public.”129 Colorado classifies taxicabs as common 
                                                        
122. California PUC, supra note 116, at 24. 
123. Id. at 26. 
124.  Id. at 26, 29-30. 
125.  Id. at 26. 
126.  Id. at 28-29. 
127.  Id. at 31-32. 
128. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-10.1-103(1) (stating that [a]ll common 
carriers and contract carriers are declared to be public utilities” and are thus 
subject to control by the PUC. Common carries are defined as follows:  
129.  Id. at § 40-10.1-106(1),(a)  
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carriers under its statutory code, and the legislature defines common carriers as 
“[e]very person directly or indirectly affording a means of transportation, or any 
service or facility in connection therewith, within this state by motor vehicle or 
other vehicle whatever by indiscriminately accepting and carrying passengers for 
compensation.”130  A taxicab operator is required to carry liability insurance,131 is 
subject to a national fingerprint-based criminal history record check,132 and must 
obtain from the PUC a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (“CPCN”), 
which essentially states that public convenience requires such operation.133  The 
CPCN, through the authority of the PUC, “specifies the type of service to be 
provided and the geographic area to be covered.”134 
 Lyft launched in Denver in September 2012, and UberX entered the 
market two months later,135 in October.136 Almost immediately, the Colorado 
                                                        
130 . Id. at § 40-1-102(3)(a)(I).  
131. Id. at § 40-10.1-107 
132.  Id. at § 40-10.1-110 
133  Id. at § 40-10.1-201 
134.  Common and Contract Carriers, COLORADO.GOV, 
http://cdn.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite/DORA-PUC/CBON/DORA/1251633067827 
(Mar. 26, 2014) 
135. Uber Black, one of Uber’s services that offers a more luxurious ride 
through partnerships with licensed limousine companies, was Uber’s first 
introduction to Denver. It was met with strong resistance, but regulatory 
proposals that sought to effectively put them out of business ultimately failed, 
and Uber Black was given the virtual green light. See Andy Vuong, Judge’s 
proposed rules would probably drive Uber out of Colorado, DENVER POST (Aug. 
5, 2013), http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_23801122/judges-
proposed-rules-would-probably-drive-uber-out?source=pkg; Andy Vuong, 
Colorado regulators give the green light to e-hailing startup Uber, DENVER POST 
(Sept. 17, 2013), 
http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_24116352/colorado-regulators-
give-green-light-e-hailing-startup?source=pkg. 
136. Andy Vuong, PUC to investigate low-cost ride-sharing services Lyft and 
uberX, DENVER POST (Dec. 11, 2013),  
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Public Utilities Commission convened to determine whether an investigation was 
needed to decide whether the companies’ services should to be subject to 
regulation.137 Prior to the meeting, the PUC made its position quite clear, stating 
that “[t]he commission staff believes that [rideshare companies] are providing 
common carrier service and they fall under the regulation of the commission.”138 
Each company also firmly took its stance, with Uber’s Denver general manager 
Will McCollum noting that it “provides consumers reliable transportation option 
through the convenience of the Uber app” and “[i]t’s 30 percent cheaper than a 
taxi.”139 Lyft cofounder and president John Zimmer countered the PUC more 
directly, saying that “[c]urrent PUC rules were written prior to a solution like Lyft 
being possible and Lyft is not a common carrier.”140 Many entrepreneurs and 
technology enthusiasts saw heavy regulation of the companies as destructive to 
Colorado’s reputation as a hub for innovation.141 After all, in 2011, Colorado 
Governor John Hickenlooper launched the Colorado Innovation Network, an 
annual global business summit aimed to “make Colorado the best state in the 
                                                        
http://www.denverpost.com/business/ci_24698031/puc-investigate-low-cost-
ride-sharing-services-lyft . 
137.  Id. 
138.  Id. (quoting PUC spokesman, Terry Bote). 
139. Id. (quoting Uber Denver general manager Will McCollum) 
140. Id. (quoting Lyft cofounder and president John Zimmer) 
141.  Andy Vuong, Uber tax battle threatens to hurt Colorado’s tech and 
business image, DENVER POST, (Aug. 11, 2013), 
http://www.denverpost.com/business/ci_23833414/uber-taxi-battle-threatens-
hurt-colorados-tech-and. Eric Mitisek, CEO of the Colorado Technology Group, a 
trade group with over 600 member companies, remarked “At a time when we’re 
working really hard to position Colorado as an innovation and technology-
friendly state to attract Google, Amazon, Microsoft, eBay and [a] lot of the true-
play internet companies to do more business here, this is not a good 
representation of the business climate.” Id. 
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nation to do business in by supporting entrepreneurs, encouraging innovation 
and promoting the state’s highly-skilled workforce.”142 
 Denver’s taxi companies and drivers, claiming not to oppose innovation, 
demanded that transportation services like UberX and Lyft (and others that may 
follow), be held to the same existing rules as taxis.143 In the name of fair 
competition and public safety, taxi companies argued that the same regulations 
be applied to ridesharing companies.144 The PUC held firm with its position that 
UberX and Lyft must be regulated as taxicabs, or the legislature must pass a bill 
that says otherwise. The PUC warned that if the legislature did not pass a bill, the 
PUC would be forced to shut down all UberX and Lyft operations.145 
 A bipartisan group of state senators responded by drafting Senate Bill 125. 
Much like California, the bill proposed to classify Lyft and UberX as 
Transportation Network Companies (“TNC”), creating a new class of companies 
subject to limited PUC regulation.146 To achieve this, the legislature specifically 
exempted TNCs from the definitions of a “common carrier,” “contract carrier,” 
and “motor carrier.” The bill defines a TNC as  
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DENVER BUS. J. (Jan. 14, 2014) 
http://www.bizjournals.com/denver/blog/boosters_bits/2014/01/uberx-lyft-
ride-sharing-apps-under.html?page=all. 
144.  Id. 
145. Vincent Carroll, Lyft and uberX are latest threat to taxi oligopoly, 
DENVER POST, (Jan. 7, 2014), 
http://www.denverpost.com/carroll/ci_24864612/carroll-lyft-and-uberx-are-
latest-threat-taxi. 
146. Andy Vuong, PUC director raises concerns about Uber and Lyft’s ride-




a corporation, partnership, sole proprietorship, or other entity, 
operating in Colorado, that uses a digital network to connect riders 
to drivers for the purpose of providing transportation.  a 
transportation network company does not provide taxi service, 
transportation service arranged through a transportation broker, 
ridesharing arrangements . . . or any transportation service over 
fixed routes at regular intervals. A transportation network company 
is not deemed to own, control, operate, or manage the personal 
vehicles used by transportation network company drivers.147 
 
The measure proposes, through detailed and specific language, to require the 
companies to, among other things, carry liability insurance,148 conduct 
background checks of drivers, and obtain operating permits.149 By a 29-6 vote, 
the bill passed the Senate and now moves on to the House.150 
                                                        
147. S.B. 14-125, 69th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Co. 2014), available at 
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Coverage to Cover “Insurance Gap” for ride-sharing drivers, DENVER POST (Mar. 
14, 2014), http://blogs.denverpost.com/techknowbytes/2014/03/14/uberx-
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covered the driver, the “insurance gap” question was raised after an UberX driver 
in San Francisco hit and killed a 6 year-old girl while he didn’t have a fare. Id. 
149. Andy Vuong, Colorado Senate Approves UberX and Lyft Ride-Sharing 
Bill, DENVER POST (Mar. 10, 2014), 
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Uber claims  that in its current form, the bill would effectively kill UberX 
operations in Colorado. See Greg Avery, UberX ride-haring not going away in 




IV. Ridesharing Legislation in Pennsylvania 
 Before discussing a potential legislative solution that embraces ridesharing 
in Pennsylvania, the relevant existing regulatory framework must be examined. 
Similar to Colorado, Pennsylvania classifies a taxicab as a “common carrier by 
motor vehicle,” a subcategory of “common carrier,”151 and the legislature defines 
common carrier by motor vehicle as  
[a]ny common carrier who or which holds out or undertakes the 
transportation of passengers or property, or both, or any class of 
passengers or property, between points within this Commonwealth 
by motor vehicle for compensation, whether or not the owner or 
operator of such motor vehicle, or who or which provides or furnishes 
any motor vehicle, with or without driver, for transportation or for 
use in transportation of persons or property . . .152  
Further, because a common carrier by motor vehicle is considered a public utility, 
taxicab operations are subject to the broad regulatory power of the Pennsylvania 
Public Utilities Commission (“PUC”), which maintains the authority to “regulate 
and supervise all public utilities doing business within the Commonwealth.”153 
The PUC “may make such regulations, not inconsistent with law, as may be 
                                                        
151.  “Common carrier” is defined as 
Any and all persons or corporations holding out, offering, or 
undertaking, directly or indirectly, service for compensation to the 
public for the transportation of passengers or property, or both, or 
any class of passengers or property, between points within this 
Commonwealth by, through, over, above, or under land, water, or 
air, and shall include forwarders, but shall not include contract 
carriers by motor vehicles, or brokers, or any bona fide cooperative 
association transporting property exclusively for the members of 
such association on a nonprofit basis.  
 
66 Pa.C.S.A. § 102. 
 
152. Id. 
153. 66 Pa.C.S.A. § 501(b) (West 2014) 
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necessary or proper in the exercise of its powers or for the performance of its 
duties.”154 The PUC further classifies common carriers of motor vehicles into six 
categories, and each category is subject to different regulations.155 Taxicabs fall 
under “call or demand service,” which is described as [l]ocal common carrier 
service for passengers, rendered on either an exclusive or a nonexclusive basis, 
where the service is characterized by the fact that passengers normally hire the 
vehicle and its driver either by telephone call or by hail, or both.”156 But, while the 
PUC holds regulatory authority over the vast majority of taxicabs in 
Pennsylvania, the exception is Philadelphia. There, in April 2005, the PUC 
transferred oversight of “medallion” taxicabs to the Philadelphia Parking 
Authority (“PPA”),157 an independent administrative agency that drafted its own 
                                                        
154.  Id. Because the PUC cannot promulgate regulations inconsistent with law, 
it would be unable to counter state legislative actions. 
155. 52 Pa. Code § 29.13(2). The five categories are: scheduled route service, 
call or demand service, group and party service, limousine service, airport 
transfer service, and other services; paratransit, experimental. Id. 
156.  Id. 
157.  Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission [hereinafter “Pennsylvania 
PUC”], Philadelphia Taxis and Limousines, PUC.GOV, 
http://www.puc.pa.gov/utility_industry/transportation/motor_carrier/philadel
phia_taxicabs_and_limousines_.aspx. Medallion taxicabs “are identified by the 
presence of a metal disc upon the hood of the taxicab, and the presence of a four 
digit number preceded by the letter “P”, painted on the fenders of the taxicab.” Id. 
They must comply with specific, codified requirements of operations, drivers, and 
vehicles. See 52 Pa. Code § 30. According to the PUC, “currently there are five 
non-Medallion taxi carriers authorized to provide taxicab service to designated 
areas within Philadelphia on a non-city wide basis” and the PPA “will regulate 
these carriers when they are providing service in PPA authorized vehicles 
between points in their Philadelphia designated area, from points in their 
Philadelphia designated area to destinations outside of Philadelphia, and from 
points outside of Philadelphia to points within their Philadelphia designated 
area.” Pennsylvania PUC, Philadelphia Taxis and Limousines. 
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rules and regulations pertaining to taxicabs, replacing previously applicable PUC 
regulations.158  
Taxicabs operating within Pennsylvania (other than Philadelphia), are 
required to licensed by the PUC, through an application for a certificate of public 
convenience.159 The taxis are subject to a variety of service standards and 
requirements. 160 Vehicles must be pass state safety inspections,161 must comply 
with a variety of equipment requirements,162 and cannot be more than eight 
model-years old.163 Drivers must be at least 21 years of age,164 and must be 
approved after a cab company obtains and reviews a criminal background check.  
The companies are required to disqualify any prospective or current driver if he 
or she is, or was, “convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor under the laws of the 
Commonwealth or under the laws of another jurisdiction, to the extent the 
conviction relates adversely to that person's suitability to provide service safely 
and legally.”165 In addition, taxicabs operating within Pennsylvania must 
maintain adequate insurance liability coverage (a minimum of $35,000),166 and 
must charge fees that are set and approved by the PUC.167 All rules and 
                                                        
158.  Id. 
159.  See 66 Pa.C.S.A. § 1103. 
160. 52 Pa. Code § 29.313. 
161.  Id. at § 29.405. 
162. Id. at §§ 29.402, 29.403. 
163. Id. at § 29.314. 
164. Id. at § 29.503. 
 
165. 52 Pa. Code § 29.505 
166.  Id. at § 32.11. More specifically, “[t]he $35,000 minimum coverage is split 
coverage in the amounts of $15,000 bodily injury per person, $30,000 bodily 
injury per accident and $5,000 property damage per accident.” Id. 
167.  Pennsylvania PUC, supra note 153. 
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regulations pertaining to taxicabs (and other “motor carriers”) are immediately 
supervised and enforced by a subdivision of the PUC, the Motor Carrier Services 
& Enforcement Division.168 
 Disruption of the taxicab industry in Pittsburgh began with the arrival of 
Lyft to the city on February 7, 2014,169 and with UberX several days later.170 
Within a matter of days, the heads of the city’s two main taxi providers, Star 
Transportation Group and Pittsburgh Transportation Group, sent a letter to 
Mayor Bill Peduto requesting that the Mayor shut down the rideshare companies’ 
operations.171 The letter also contained a draft of a city ordinance that would 
empower City of Pittsburgh police officers with the authority to cite UberX and 
Lyft drivers for operating without a permit from the PUC, a violation of state 
law.172 Much to the dismay of the taxi companies, Mayor Peduto then sent a letter 
of his own to PUC executive director Jan Freeman, asking that the Commission 
consider a rule change in order to accommodate much-needed competition. The 
Mayor remarked “I support the expansion of transportation options in our city 
and recognize the need for a broader and more diverse suite of options to get 
people around town quickly, safely, and reliably.”173 Specifically, the Mayor 
                                                        
168.  Pennsylvania PUC, Motor Carriers, PUC.GOV, 
http://www.puc.state.pa.us/consumer_info/transportation/motor_carrier/appli
cations.aspx. 
169.  See Coyne, supra note 9. 
170.  See Meagan, supra note 10. 
171.  See Kim Lyons and Moriah Balingit, Pittsburgh Cab Firms Try to Cut Off 
Newcomers, PITT. POST-GAZETTE (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.post-
gazette.com/news/transportation/2014/02/13/Local-cab-firms-try-to-cut-off-
newcomers/stories/201402130204 
172.  Id. 
173.  Kim Lyons, Peduto Asks for Rule Change on Ride-Sharing Operations, 
PITT. POST-GAZETTE (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.post-
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proposed that the PUC amend Chapter 29 of the Public Utility Code to create a 
new class of transportation providers, similar to what California did.174 Current 
regulations, lamented Councilman Dan Gilman, “are too onerous . . . [t]hey're 
structured to what cab companies looked like in the 1980s.”175  
PUC Spokeswoman Jennifer Kocher responded to calls for a rule change 
by pointing out that while the agency appreciates Mayor Peduto’s suggestions 
and recommendations, “nobody has come to [the PUC] with a business model 
and explained what in the current regulations don't work for them, what changes 
they would need to see.”176 Weeks later, however, Mayor Peduto met with the 
Chairman of the PUC, Robert Powelson, who acknowledged the need for a 
regulatory change in favor of ride sharing companies, saying that “[t]hese 
applications force us to get outside our 1960s regulations and come into 2014. . . . 
We as a commission need to get out of our own way and embrace and work with 
these carriers."177 Powelson also offered advice for the taxi companies fearful of 
the competition: "[y]ou need to innovate, and you can't expect to have exclusive, 
territorial rights anymore.”178 179 
                                                        
gazette.com/business/2014/02/18/Peduto-asks-for-rule-change-on-ride-
sharing-operations/stories/201402180175#ixzz2zApPm2BZ 
174.  Id. 
175.  Id. 
176.  Id. 
177.  Kym Lyons and Moriah Balingit, Ride-Share Firms Gain More Traction 
With Support from PUC, PITT. POST-GAZETTE (Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.post-
gazette.com/business/2014/02/25/Ride-share-firms-gain-more-traction-in-Pa-
talks/stories/201402250111#ixzz2zAvaQsIq 
178.  Id. 
179. Recently, perhaps in response to challenges to innovate, Yellow Cab 
applied to the PUC for an alternative “call or demand service” it would call 
“Yellow X,” a not-so-subtle dig at competitor, UberX. “Yellow X” would 
essentially operate under the business model of ride share companies, where 
 37 
Thus, it appears that Pittsburgh, and the PUC, are committed to drafting 
regulations that encourage competition, increase consumer choice, and provide 
for a safe and reliable form of transportation. However, it will need to take the 
form of either legislation from the General Assembly, or a resolution passed by 
the PUC, in order to become effective. State Representative Erin Molchany (D-
Mt. Washington) has pledged to sponsor such legislation, as has Rep. Ed Gainey 
(D-East Liberty).180  
It is my position that the General Assembly use the regulations passed by 
the California Public Utilities Commission, as well as the senate bill passed in 
Colorado, to draft a bill that embraces ride sharing in Pennsylvania. The 
following is a first draft on which to build. 
Bill Summary 
 
 The bill authorizes the Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission (“The 
Commission” or “PUC”) to regulate Transportation Network Companies, which 
are companies that match drivers and passengers through a digital network, such 
as a mobile phone application, for transportation from an agreed-upon point of 
origin to an agreed-upon destination. 
 
 Section 1 of the bill exempts Transportation Network Companies from 
the definition of “common carrier by motor vehicle.”  
 Section 2 exempts Transportation Network Companies from the 
definition of “contract carrier by motor vehicle.”  
 Sections 3 adds a new scheme of classification to enable the Commission 
to exercise limited regulatory authority over Transportation Network 
Companies. 
 Section 4 exempts Transportation Network Companies from much of the 
PUC's authority, including regulation of rates, entry, operational 
requirements, and general requirements governing common carriers, 
                                                        
personal vehicles would be used and an app would connect driver and passenger. 
The PUC gave no timetable for its approval. See Kim Lyons, Yellow Cab Applies 
for License for Ride Share Service, PITT. POST-GAZETTE (Apr. 11, 2014), 
http://www.post-gazette.com/business/2014/04/12/Yellow-Cab-applies-for-
license-for-ride-share-company/stories/201404120013. 
180.  Lyons and Balingit, supra note 172. 
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contract carriers, and motor carriers, but does require a Transportation 
Network Company to obtain a permit from the PUC. Section 4 authorizes 
the PUC to regulate permit holders with respect to safety conditions, 
insurance requirements, and driver qualifications. Section 4 also 
authorizes the PUC to take action against a transportation network 
company for any violations, including the authority to issue a cease-and-




Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Pennsylvania: 
 
 
Section 1. In Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, 66-102, amend “common 
carrier by motor vehicle” and “public utility” as follows: 
 
§ 102. Definitions.  
 
“Common Carrier by motor vehicle” means any common carrier who or which 
holds out or undertakes the transportation of passengers or property, or both, or 
any class of passengers or property, between points within this Commonwealth 
by motor vehicle for compensation, whether or not the owner or operator of such 
motor vehicle, or who or which provides or furnishes any motor vehicle, with or 
without driver, for transportation or for use in transportation of persons or 
property as aforesaid, and shall include common carriers by rail, water, or air, 
and express or forwarding public utilities insofar as such common carriers or 
such public utilities are engaged in such motor vehicle operations, but does not 
include 
 
 (10) A Transportation Network Company, as defined in 52 Pa. Code 
29.602, or a Transportation Network Driver, as defined in 52 Pa. Code 29.602 
 
“Public utility.” (1) Any person or corporations now or hereafter owning or 
operating in this Commonwealth equipment or facilities for: 
 
 iii(a) Transporting passengers as a Transportation Network Company 
 
 
Section 2. In Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, 66-2501, amend “contract 
carrier by motor vehicle” (2) as follows: 
 
§ 2601. Declaration of Policy and Definitions 
 (2) The term “contract carrier by motor vehicle” does not include: 
  (X) A Transportation Network Company, as defined in 52 Pa. Code 




Section 3. In Pennsylvania Administrative Code 52-29.13, amend classifications 
as follows: 
  
§ 29.13 Scheme of Classification 
 
 (7) Online-enabled service. Local service for passengers, rendered on 
either an exclusive or a nonexclusive basis, where the service is characterized by 
the fact that passengers hire a Transportation Network Company vehicle and its 
driver by requesting a ride through a digital network application. 
 






Transportation Network Companies 
 
52 Pa. Code 29.601. Short title. This article shall be known and may be cited 
as the “Transportation Network Company Act.” 
 
52 Pa. Code 29.602. Definitions. As used in this Part 4, unless the context 
otherwise requires: 
 
 (1) “Personal Vehicle” means a vehicle used by a Transportation Network 
Company Driver in connection with providing services for a Transportation 
Network Company that meets the vehicle criteria set for in this Part 4. 
 (2) “Prearranged ride” means a period of time that begins when a driver 
accepts a requested ride from a rider through a digital network, continues while 
the driver transports the rider in a personal vehicle, and ends when the rider 
departs from the personal vehicle. 
 (3) “Transportation Network Company” means a corporation, partnership, 
sole proprietorship, or other entity, operating in Pennsylvania, that uses a digital 
network to connect riders to drivers for the purpose of providing transportation. 
A Transportation Network Company does not provide taxi service, transportation 
service arranged through a broker, ridesharing arrangements, as defined in 55 
P.S. § 695.1, or any transportation service over fixed routes at regular intervals. A 
Transportation Network Company does not own, control, operate, or manage the 
personal vehicles used by Transportation Network Company drivers. A 
Transportation Network Company does not include a political subdivision or 
other entity exempted from federal income tax under section 115 of the Federal 
“Internal Revenue Code of 1986” as amended. 
 (4) “Transportation Network Company Driver or “Driver” means an 
individual who uses his or her personal vehicle to provide transportation services 
for riders matched through a Transportation Network Company’s digital 
network. A driver need not be an employee of a Transportation Network 
Company. 
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 (5) “Transportation Network Company Rider” or “Rider” means a 
passenger in a Transportation Network Company vehicle for whom transport is 
provided, including: an individual who uses a Transportation Network 
Company’s online application or digital network to connect with a Driver to 
obtain services in the Driver’s vehicle for the individual and anyone in the 
individual’s party. 
 (6) “Transportation Network Company Services” or “Services” means the 
provision of transportation by a Driver to a Rider with whom the Driver is 
matched through a Transportation Network Company. The term does not include 
services provided either directly by or under contract with a political subdivision 
or other entity exempt from federal income tax under section 115 of the federal 
“Internal Revenue Code of 1986”, as amended. 
 
52 Pa. Code 29.603. Limited Regulation. Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, Transportation Network Companies are governed exclusively by 
this Part 4. A Transportation Network Company is exempt from the 
Commission’s rate, entry, operational, or common carrier requirements, unless 
otherwise set forth in this Part 4. 
 
52 Pa. Code 29.604. Registration – financial responsibility of 
transportation network companies – insurance. A Transportation 
Network Company shall comply with the filing requirements of Part 3 and the 
registered agent requirement of Part 7. 
 (1) If a Transportation Network Company’s insurer makes a payment for a 
claim covered under comprehensive coverage or collision coverage, the 
Transportation Network Company shall cause its insurer to issue payment 
directly to the business repairing the vehicle or jointly to the owner of the vehicle 
and the primary lienholder on the covered vehicle. The Commission shall not 
assess any fines as a result of this subsection 5. 
 
52 Pa. Code 29.605. Operational requirements. (1) The following 
requirements apply to the provision of services: 
 (a) A Driver shall not provide services unless a Transportation Network 
Company has matched the Driver to a Rider through a digital network. A driver 
shall not solicit or accept the physical summoning of a ride commonly known as a 
“street hail.” 
 (b) A Transportation Network Company shall make available to 
prospective Riders and Drivers the method by which the company calculates 
fares and the applicable rates being charged and an option to receive an estimate 
fare. 
 (c) After completion of a prearranged ride, a Transportation Network 
Company shall transmit to the rider an electronic receipt, either by electronic 
mail or text message, documenting: 
  (i) the point of original and final destination of the prearranged 
ride; 
  (ii) the total duration and distance of the prearranged ride; 
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  (iii) the total fare paid, including the base fare and any additional 
charges incurred; 
  (iv) the driver’s first name and telephone number; and 
  (v) notification to Riders of the Transportation Network Company’s 
intoxicating substance policy, including the method to report a Driver that a 
Rider suspects is under the influence of an intoxicating substance. 
 (d) Before permitting a person to act as a Driver, a Transportation 
Network Company shall confirm that the person is twenty-one years of age or 
older and posseses: 
  (i) a valid driver’s license; 
  (ii) proof of personal automobile insurance; 
  (iii) proof of a Pennsylvania vehicle registration; and 
  (iv) within ninety days of the effective date of this Part 4 and 
pursuant to Commission rules, proof that the person is medically fit to drive. 
 (e) A Driver shall not offer or provide Transportation Network Company 
services in excess of the maximum service hours as determined by the 
Commission. 
 (f) A Transportation Network Company shall implement an intoxicating 
substance policy for drivers that prohibits any amount of intoxication of the 
driver while providing services. the transportation network company shall 
include on its website, mobile device application software, and electronic 
receipts, a notice concerning the transportation network company's intoxicating 
substance policy. 
 (g) (I) A Transportation Network Company shall have a mechanic certified 
by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation conduct a safety inspection of 
a prospective driver’s vehicle before it is approve for use as a personal vehicle and 
shall have annual inspection of the personal vehicle thereafter. A safety 
inspection shall include an inspection of: 
(A) foot brakes; 
(B) emergency brakes; 
(D) steering mechanism; 
(C) windshield; 
(E) rear window and other glass; 
(F) windshield wipers; 
(G) headlights; 
(H) tail lights; 
(I) turn indicator lights; 
(J) stop lights; 
(K) front seat adjustment mechanism; 




(P) muffler and exhaust system; 
(Q) tire conditions, including tread depth; 
(R) interior and exterior rear-view mirrors; and 
(S)  safety belts. 
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II. The Commission may also conduct inspection of personal 
vehicles. 
(h) A person vehicle must: 
 (I) Have at least four doors; and 
 (II) Be designed to carry no more than eight passengers, including 
the Driver. 
(i) A Transportation Network Company shall make the following 
disclosure to a prospective driver in the prospective driver's terms of service: 
While operating on the transportation network  company's digital 
network, your personal automobile insurance policy might not 
afford liability coverage, depending on the policy's terms. 
 
(j) (I) a Transportation Network Company shall make the following 
disclosure to a prospective Driver in the prospective Driver's terms of service:  
If the vehicle that you plan to use to provide transportation network 
company services for our transportation network company has a 
lien against it, you must notify the lienholder that you will be using 
the vehicle for transportation services that may violate the terms of 
your contract with the lienholder. 
 
     (II) The disclosure set forth in subparagraph (i) of this Paragraph (j) 
must be placed prominently in the prospective Driver’s written terms of service, 
and the prospective driver must acknowledge the terms of service electronically 
or by signature. 
(k) A Transportation Network Company shall make the following 
disclosure to a Rider: 
 While riding as a passenger in a Transportation Network Company 
Driver’s personal vehicle, a Rider is insured under the terms of the 
Transportation Network Company’s liability policy. 
(l) A Transportation Network Company shall make available to a Rider a 
customer support telephone number on its mobile application or website for 
Rider inquiries. 
(m) A Transportation Network Company shall disclose to a Rider the 
information set forth in Paragraph (i) in this subsection about the Transportation 
Network Company’s liability policy and the Driver’s personal automobile 
insurance policy. 
(n) The primary insurance coverage and disclosures set forth in this 
subsection take effect on June 28, 2014. 
(o) (I) A Transportation Network Company shall not disclose to a third 
party any personally identifiable information concerning a user of the 
Transportation Network Company’s digital network unless: 
(A) The Transportation Network Company obtains the user’s consent to 
disclose personally identifiable information; 
(B) Disclosure is necessary to comply with a legal obligation; or 
(C) Disclosure is necessary to protect or defend the terms and conditions 
for use of the service or to investigate violations of the terms and conditions. 
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II) The limitation of disclosure does not apply to other information about 
the user that is not personally identifiable. 
(p) Any taxicab company or shuttle company authorized by the 
commission under this article may convert to a Transportation Network 
Company model or may create a subsidiary or affiliate Transportation Network 
Company. In converting to a Transportation Network Company Model or setting 
up a Transportation Network Company subsidiary or affiliate, a taxicab company 
or shuttle company authorized by the commission under this article may 
completely or partially suspend its certificate of public convenience and necessity 
issued pursuant to 66 Pa.C.S.A. § 1103. During the period of suspension of its 
certificate of public convenience and necessity, a taxicab company, shuttle 
company, or a subsidiary or affiliate of a taxicab company or shuttle company is 
exempt from taxi or shuttle standards under this article, the standards 
concerning the regulation of rates and charges under article 3 of this title, and 
any commission rules regarding common carriers promulgated under this article 
or article 3 of this title.  
(q) Each Transportation Network Company shall require that each 
Transportation Network Company vehicle providing Transportation Network 
Company Services display an exterior marking that identifies the Transportation 
Network Company vehicle as a vehicle for hire. The marking need not be 
permanent. 
(1) A Transportation Network Company or a third party shall retain 
accurate inspection records for at least fourteen months after an inspection was 
conducted for each personal vehicle used by a Driver. 
(2)(a) Before a person is permitted to act as a Driver through the use of a 
Transportation Network Company’s Digital Network, the Transportation 
Network Company shall: 
(I) Obtain a criminal history record check from the Pennsylvania State 
Police and through a privately administered national criminal record check, 
including the national sex offender database; and shall obtain a new criminal 
history record every five years while the individual is serving as a Driver. 
     (b) (I) A person who has been convicted of or pled guilty or nolo 
contender to driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol in the previous seven 
years before applying to become a Driver shall not serve as a Driver. If the 
criminal history record check reveals that the person has ever been convicted of 
or pled guilty or nolo contender to any of the following felony offenses, the 
person shall not serve as a Driver: 
 A) An offense involving fraud, as described in Title 18, Pa.C.S.A.; 
 B) An offense involving unlawful sexual behavior, as defined in 
Chapter 31 of Article B of Title 18, Pa.C.S.A. 
 C) An offense against property, as described in Article C of Title 18, 
Pa.C.S.A.; or 
 D) A crime of violence, as described in Article B, Title 18, Pa.C.S.A. 
 (II) A person who has been convicted of a comparable offense to the 
offenses listed in subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (b) in another state in the 
United States shall not serve as a Driver. 
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 (III) A Transportation Network Company or a third party shall 
retain accurate results of the criminal history record check for each Driver that 
provides services for the Transportation Network Company for at least five years 
after the criminal history check was conducted. 
 (IV) A person who has, within the immediately preceding five years, 
been convicted of or pled guilty or nolo contender to a felony shall not serve as a 
Driver. 
 (4)(a) Before permitting an individual to act as a Driver on its 
digital network, a Transportation Network Company shall obtain and review a 
driving history research report for the individual. 
 (b) An individual with the following moving violations shall not 
serve as a Driver: 
 (I) More than three moving violations preceding the individual’s 
application to serve as a Driver; or 
 (II) A serious traffic offense, as described by Chapter 27, subchapter 
B, Title 75, Pa.C.S.A., in the three-year period preceding the individual’s 
application to serve as a Driver whether committed in this state, another state, or 
the United States, including vehicular eluding, as described in Section 3733, 
Pa.C.S.A., reckless driving, as described in Section 3736, Pa.C.S.A., and 
aggravated assault by vehicle, as described in Section 3772.1, Pa.C.S.A. 
 (c) A Transportation Network Company or a third party shall retain 
accurate results of the driving history research report for each driver that 
provides services for the Transportation Network company for at least three 
years. One year from the effective date of this Part 4 and annually thereafter, each 
Transportation Network Company shall submit to the Motor Carrier Services & 
Enforcement Division a verified report detailing the number of drivers that were 
found to have committed a moving violation or serious traffic offense, the as well 
as a list of Rider complaints pertaining to an intoxicating substance policy and 
the outcome of the investigation into those complaints. 
(5) If any person files a complaint with the Commission against a 
transportation network company or driver, the Commission may inspect the 
Transportation Network Company's records as reasonably necessary to 
investigate and resolve the complaint. 
(6) (a) a transportation network company shall provide services to 
the public in a nondiscriminatory manner, regardless of geographic location of 
the departure point or destination, race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, 
disability, or other potentially discriminatory factor that could prevent customers 
from accessing transportation. A Transportation Network may provide platforms 
for Drivers and Riders to rate each other but a Transportation Network shall 
monitor the rating system for discriminatory behavior. A driver shall not refuse 
to transport a passenger unless: 
 (I)  The passenger is acting in an unlawful, disorderly, or 
endangering manner;   
(II) The passenger is unable to care for himself or herself and is not 
in the charge of a responsible companion; or 
(III) The Driver has already committed to providing a ride for 
another rider. 
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(b) A Transportation Network Company shall not impose additional 
charges for providing services to persons with physical or mental 
disabilities. 
(c) A Driver shall permit a service animal to accompany a rider on a 
prearranged ride. 
(d) If a Rider with physical or mental disabilities requires the use of 
mobility equipment, a Criver shall store the mobility equipment in the 
vehicle during a prearranged ride. 
(e) A Transportation Network Company's web site and on-line 
applications must comply with the web content accessibility guidelines 
2.0, as may be subsequently amended, published by the web accessibility 
initiative or successor organization. 
(7) A Driver shall immediately report to the transportation network 
company any refusal to transport a  passenger pursuant to paragraph (a) 
of subsection (6) of this section, and the transportation network company 
shall annually report all such refusals to the commission in a form and 
manner determined by the commission. 
(8) One year from the effective date of this Part 4 and annually 
thereafter, each Transportation Network Company shall submit to the 
Motor Carrier Services & Enforcement Division a verified report detailing 
the number or rides requested and accepted by Transportation Network 
Company Drivers within each zip code where the Transportation Network 
Company operates; and the number of rides that were requested but not 
accepted by the Transportation Network Company drivers within each zip 
code where the Transportation Network Company operates. 
 
52 Pa. Code 29.606. Permit required for transportation network 
companies – penalty for violation – rules. (1) A person shall not operate a 
Transportation Network Company in Pennsylvania without first having obtained 
a permit from the Commission. 
 (2) The Commission shall issue a permit to each Transportation Network 
Company that meets the requirements of this Part 4 and pays a permit fee to the 
commission. The permit is valid for one year. 
(3) The permit fee for the initial one-year permit for each of the two 
Transportation Network Companies operating in Pennsylvania on the effective 
date of this Part 4 is one hundred seven thousand five hundred dollars. If a third 
Transportation Network Company applies for a permit before the permit fee has 
been readjusted for the first time under subsection (4) of this section, the 
Transportation Network Company shall pay a permit fee of seventy-one thousand 
six hundred sixty-seven dollars and the two other permit holders shall each be 
refunded one-half of the permit fee paid by the third permit holder. If a fourth 
Transportation Network Company applies for a permit fee before the permit fee 
has been readjusted for the first time under subsection (4) of this section, that 
Transportation Network Company shall pay a permit fee of fifty-three thousand 
seven hundred fifty dollars and the three other permit holders shall each be 
refunded one-third of the permit fee paid by the fourth permit holder. For a fifth 
or subsequent Transportation Network Company seeking a permit before the 
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permit fee has been readjusted for the first time under subsection (4) of this 
section, the Commission shall set the fee by determining the Transportation 
Network Company's pro rata share of two hundred fifteen thousand dollars and 
shall refund to the other permit holders a pro rata share of the Transportation 
Network Company’s permit fee. 
(4) The General Assembly, at each regular session, shall determine the 
Commission's administrative expenses for regulating Transportation Network 
Companies under this Part 4, including any FTE additions or reductions that may 
be necessary. The Commission shall assess permit fees in amounts that, in the 
aggregate, equal the Commission's administrative expenses, as determined by the 
General Assembly. The commission shall assess a permit fee against each 
Transportation Network Company operating in Pennsylvania in an amount 
apportioned on the basis of the number of personal vehicles associated with the 
Transportation Network Company. 
(5) The cumulative amount of the annual permit fees for all 
Transportation Network Companies operating in Pennsylvania must not exceed 
two hundred fifteen thousand dollars unless the General Assembly determines 
that an increased aggregate amount is necessary and appropriate.  
(6) The Commission shall determine the form and manner of application 
for a Transportation Network Company permit. 
(7) The Commission may take action against a Transportation Network 
Company including issuing an order to cease and desist and suspending, 
revoking, altering, or amending a permit issued to the Transportation Network 
Company. 
(8) (a) For a violation of this Part 4 or a failure to comply with a 
Commission order, decision, or rule issued under this Part 4, a Transportation 
Network Company is subject to the Commission authority. 
(b) The Commission shall not assess a penalty against a Driver. 
(9) The Commission may deny an application under this Part 4 or refuse to 
renew the permit of a Transportation Network Company based on a 
determination that the Transportation Network Company has not satisfied a civil 
penalty arising out of an administrative or enforcement action brought by the 
Commission. 
 
52 Pa. Code 29.607. Fees - transportation network company fund – creation. 
The Commission shall transmit all fees collected pursuant to this Part 4 to the 
State Treasurer, who shall credit the fees to the Transportation Network 
Company Fund, which is hereby created in the State Treasury. The moneys in the 
fund are continuously appropriated to the Commission for the purposes set forth 
in this Part 4. All interest earned from the investment of moneys in the fund is 
credited to the fund. Any moneys not expended at the end of the fiscal year 
remain in the fund and do not revert to the general fund or any other fund. 
 
Pa. Code 29.608. Rules. (1) The Commission may promulgate rules consistent 
with this Part 4, including rules concerning administration, fees, and safety 
requirements.  
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 (2) (a) The Commission, in consultation with the Division of Insurance, 
shall promulgate rules concerning financial responsibility requirements for 
Transportation Network Companies, including:  
  (I) Rules requiring each Transportation Network Company to 
maintain and file with the Commission evidence of financial responsibility and 
proof of its continued validity as the Commission deems necessary; and 
  (II) Coverage sufficient to: 
  (A) Protect Drivers, Riders, other motorists, and pedestrians; and 
  (B) Cover all times in which a Driver is logged into the 
Transportation Network Company’s Digital Network. 
  (b) In promulgating rules under this subsection (2), the 
Commission shall consider: 
  (I) Requiring Transportation Network Companies to carry full 
commercial coverage; and 
  (II) Setting the minimum amount of financial responsibility 
required as the same amount required for taxicab companies. 
  (3) The Commission, in consultation with the Division of Workers 
Compensation in the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry and upon 
consideration of existing statutory and case law, shall promulgate rules 
determining workers compensation obligations. 
 
Section 5. Safety clause. The General Assembly hereby finds, determines, and 
declares that this act is necessary for the immediate preservation of public peace, 
health, and safety.  
  
 
 
